We describe and characterize the family of asymmetric parametric division rules for the adjudication of con ‡icting claims. We take two approaches in characterizing this family. The …rst approach follows the existing literature in de…ning a claims problem. As part of the characterization in this setting, we present two novel axioms, Intrapersonal Consistency and Priority Continuity, which restrict how a division rule indirectly allocates between di¤erent versions of the same claimant. The second approach departs from the existing literature by expanding the de…nition of a claims problem to allow claimants to have multiple claims. The characterization in this setting uses the same set of axioms, though modi…ed for this expanded domain, used by Young (1987) to characterize the family of (symmetric) parametric division rules. We show that these two approaches are essentially equivalent.
Introduction
When a …rm goes bankrupt, how should its liquidated value be distributed among creditors? How should an estate be divided among heirs when more is promised in a will than is available? How should the cost of a project be shared among the group of bene…ciaries? What is a fair way to tax citizens?
The …rst two questions are known as "con ‡icting claims problems", or simply "claims problems". The problem is how to distribute fairly some good when there is insu¢ cient amount of the good to satisfy all claims on it. A solution to the problem is a "division rule", which assigns to every claims problem an allocation, or "award", to the claimants. We classify division rules by the axioms they satisfy. The problem is as old as human history, and speci…c examples with proposed awards are even o¤ered I thank Larry Epstein for his comments. I especially thank William Thomson for his guidance and suggestions.
y Email: jstovall@mail.rochester.edu in the Talmud. The problem was …rst formalized by O'Neill (1982) , and since then numerous rules and axioms have been proposed. See Thomson (2003) for a survey. Formally, the claims problem is identical to the problems of cost-sharing and fair taxation, though we will primarily use the claims interpretation.
We characterize a family of division rules which we call "asymmetric parametric rules", which is a generalization of Young's (1987) class of (symmetric) parametric rules, and which was …rst introduced by Thomson (2006, p. 99) . Asymmetric parametric rules divide as follows: There is a family of continuous functions ff i g indexed by all the possible claimants. Each f i represents a schedule of possible awards that speci…es how much claimant i is awarded over all possible values of his claim and all possible values of a parameter. So the amount awarded to i is determined by his claim, c i , and a parameter, , and is written f i (c i ; ). For a given claims problem, a common parameter is chosen for all claimants so that all of the good is distributed. The main axiom used in our characterization is Consistency, which states that if a division rule chooses an allocation for a group of claimants, then it should not choose to reallocate the awards of any subgroup when considered as a separate problem. Obviously, asymmetric parametric rules do not satisfy the axiom Symmetry, which states that claimants with equal claims should receive equal awards.
We study asymmetric division rules for two reasons. First, there are many rules, especially real-life rules, that are not symmetric. For example, U.S. bankruptcy law stipulates that when a …rm goes bankrupt, taxes owed to the federal government must be paid before other claims (see Kaminski (2000 Kaminski ( , 2006 ). The forming of a queue (e.g. to purchase tickets, to get something for free as part of a marketing promotion, to withdraw money during a bank run, etc.) is another example. Second, there is nothing inherently symmetric about the parametric method. Though Symmetry has some normative appeal, we view this as separate to the essence of Young's result, which is to understand the axiom Consistency.
We consider two approaches to characterizing this family of division rules. To understand the di¤erences between these two approaches, observe that an asymmetric parametric rule could potentially allocate intrapersonally. That is, one could observe how a rule might allocate between di¤erent versions of the same claimant by comparing, say, f i (c i ; ) to f i (c The …rst approach we take follows this convention in de…ning a claims problem, and so a division rule does not directly allocate intrapersonally. However a division rule does indirectly allocate intrapersonally. That is, one could observe how a rule allocates between i when his claim is c i and a second "go-between"claimant, j, with claim c j , and then compare that to how the rule allocates between i with claim c 0 i and j with claim c j . This would reveal how the rule allocates intrapersonally. This approach requires adding two novel axioms. The …rst, Intrapersonal Consistency, states that how the rule (indirectly) allocates between di¤erent versions of claimant i will not change when the go-between's claim c j changes. The second, Priority Continuity, states that how the rule allocates between di¤erent versions of claimant i will not change with small changes in the claim. The set of axioms that characterize asymmetric parametric rules is Continuity, Priority Continuity, a weaker version of Consistency known as Bilateral Consistency, Intrapersonal Consistency, and Resource Monotonicity.
The second approach we take allows for direct intrapersonal comparisons by expanding the de…nition of a claims problem. Such an expansion requires division rules to determine awards in hypothetical situations where one claimant has two di¤erent claims. In this setting, the set of axioms that characterize asymmetric parametric rules is the same used by Young to characterize parametric rules, namely Continuity, Bilateral Consistency, and Symmetry, though Symmetry is considerably weaker here than in the classical domain of claims problems.
We show that these two approaches essentially characterize the same family of division rules. Hence, the …rst approach makes explicit the additional assumptions that are implicit when one imposes Young's axioms on the expanded domain of claims problems in the second approach. It also demonstrates that relaxing Symmetry can be an easier exercise than one would initially think.
The di¤erence between these two approaches is comparable to the di¤erence between the two main models of subjective expected-utility theory, namely Savage and Anscombe-Aumann. Savage (1954) provides axioms which characterize subjective expected-utility over a simple domain, acts over prizes. Anscombe and Aumann (1963) provide axioms over an expanded domain, acts over lotteries. However the Anscombe-Aumann representation simpli…es to the Savage representation on the domain of Savage acts. The advantage to the Anscombe-Aumann approach is that the axioms are simpler than Savage's; in fact, they are extensions of the classic expectedutility axioms, as well as a state-independence axiom. The disadvantage to their approach is that they require a domain of choice which is arguably unrealistic and which obscures some of the underlying issues (e.g. the intuition concerning how the subjective probability is derived in the representation). Similarly, here our second approach uses simpler axioms over an expanded domain, though that domain is arguably unrealistic and obscures the issue of intrapersonal allocation.
In the literature, there is a dearth of papers on asymmetric division rules. Moulin (2000) studies a rich family of asymmetric rules that satisfy Consistency, as well as axioms not considered here, namely Upper Composition, Lower Composition, and Homogeneity. Chambers (2006) studies a similar family, though without imposing the axiom Homogeneity. Kaminski (2006) accommodates division rules like the US bankruptcy rule by expanding a claims problem so that claimants have "types", and not just claims. Thus, characteristics of the claimant (other than his claim) may a¤ect his award, and so claimants with identical claims may receive di¤erent awards if their types di¤er in other respects. Formally, the expanded de…nition of a claims problem that we give in the second approach is a special case of Kaminski's de…nition, though the two models di¤er in their interpretation of "types". The relation of the present work to Kaminski's is discussed further in Section 4.
The paper follows the following outline. Section 2 formalizes the classic claims problem, and describes several examples of division rules, including the family of asymmetric parametric rules. Section 3 characterizes the family of asymmetric parametric rules in the classic domain. Section 4 describes the expanded domain and characterizes the family of asymmetric parametric rules in that domain. We show that the two approaches are essentially equivalent in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
Model

De…nitions
The con ‡icting claims problem is simple: there is a group of people, each of whom has a claim on some divisible, homogeneous good, but there is an insu¢ cient amount of the good to satisfy all of the claims. Formally, a (classic) claims problem is a tuple (N; c; E) where N N is a …nite group of claimants, c = (
is the vector of claims, and E 2 R + is the endowment to be divided, all satisfying E P N c i . Let C denote the set of claims problems. For a …xed group N , let C N denote the set of claims problems for N . We will typically write a claims problem as (c; E) with the assumption that the group of claimants is N . An awards vector for a claims problem (c; E) is an allocation x 2 R N + satisfying P N x i = E and 0 x i c i for every i 2 N . A division rule is a function S that maps every claims problem to an awards vector.
A convenient way of graphically representing a division rule is the path of awards it generates. For a …xed set of claimants and for a …xed claims vector for those claimants, the path of awards of a rule S is the graph of all possible allocations awarded by S as E varies from 0 to the sum of claims. See Figure 1 .
Alternatively, a claims problems (c; E) can be interpreted as a cost-sharing problem or a taxation problem. Under the cost sharing interpretation, c is the vector of bene…ts each individual will receive from the shared project and E is the cost of the project. The restriction E P N c i means that the project is socially bene…cial. Under the taxation problem interpretation, c is the vector of incomes and E is the total tax to be raised.
Examples of Division Rules
The following are simple examples of division rules. Figure 2 illustrates the paths of awards for each of these division rules.
The Proportional Rule, P . For (c; E) 2 C, and i 2 N , where is chosen so that
(Note that it must be that = E P N c j .) P gives to each claimant the same proportion of his respective claim. For example, if there is only enough of the endowment to cover half of the total claims, then P will give each claimant half of his claim.
The Constrained Equal Awards Rule, CEA. For (c; E) 2 C, and i 2 N ,
where is chosen so that P N CEA j (c; E) = E. CEA gives to each claimant the same award, with the exception of those claimants who would otherwise receive more than their respective claims.
The Constrained Equal Losses Rule, CEL. For (c; E) 2 C, and i 2 N ,
where is chosen so that P N CEL j (c; E) = E. CEL equalizes losses (i.e. the di¤erence between an agent's claim and his award) across claimants, with the exception of those claimants who would otherwise receive a negative award.
The Dictatorial Rule with priority , Dic , where is a strict linear order over N. For (c; E) 2 C, and i 2 N ,
, where 2 N is chosen so that P N Dic j (c; E) = E. Dic distributes the endowment by lining up the claimants according to , and then going down the line and giving each claimant his full claim until the endowment is exhausted. 
Asymmetric Parametric Division Rules
We characterize a family of division rules that we call asymmetric parametric rules. To understand this family, consider again the examples above. In each case, the award given to a claimant is determined by his claim c i and a parameter . For a given claims problem, a common parameter is chosen for all claimants so that the sum of awards equals the endowment.
Formally, let F be the family of functions f : R ++ [a; b] ! R + , where 1 a < b 1, such that (a) f is weakly increasing in the second argument, (b) f is continuous in the second argument, and (c) for every c 0 2 R ++ we have f (c 0 ; a) = 0 and f (c 0 ; b) = c 0 . Observe that for any set of functions ff i g N F and for any claims problem (c; E) 2 C, P N f i (c i ; ) is continuous and weakly increasing. So by the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists 2 [a; b] such that P N f i (c i ; ) = E. Hence, for anyff i g N F, we can de…ne a division rule S ff i g N as follows. For (c; E) 2 C, and i 2 N , S
where is chosen so that P N f i (c i ; ) = E. We say a rule S has an asymmetric parametric representation ff i g N F if for every (c; E) 2 C, there exists 2 [a; b] such that for every i 2 N , S i (c; E) = f i (c i ; ). We say such a representation is A special case of an asymmetric parametric division rule is when f = f i for every i 2 N. Then we say S has a (symmetric) parametric representation f 2 F. Such rules were characterized by Young (1987) , and we discuss his axioms in Section 3.
Of our examples above, P , CEA, and CEL all have parametric representations, while Dic has an asymmetric parametric representation. Figure 4 illustrates their respective parametric representations. For P , f (c i ; ) = c i is a parametric representation where a = 0 and b = 1. For CEA, the function f (c i ; ) = min fc i ; g is a parametric representation where a = 0 and b = 1. For CEL, the function f (c i ; ) = max f0; c i + g is a parametric representation where a = 1 and b = 0. For Dic where is the "strictly less than" relation <, the collection of functions
is a parametric representation where a = 0 and b = 1. 
First Approach -Classic Domain
Our …rst approach at characterizing the asymmetric parametric family of rules uses the standard de…nition of a claims problem given above in Section 2. As asymmetric parametric rules are a generalization of Young's (1987) parametric rules, we …rst introduce the axioms used by Young.
One of the most important axioms studied in the literature is Consistency, which deals with how the rule allocates when the group of claimants shrinks.
We will actually use a slightly weaker version known as Bilateral Consistency, which is Consistency applied only to two-person subgroups N 0 .
To understand Consistency, consider the following. Suppose a rule chooses an allocation for a claims problem. Some claimants are given their respective awards and leave. Suppose now the rule is asked to reconsider its original allocation for those claimants who remain. That is, the rule is given the opportunity to reallocate what remains of the endowment between the claimants who have not yet received their awards.
1 The rule can choose to distribute according to the original allocation, or it can choose a new allocation. What Consistency says is that the rule will always choose the original allocation. All of the examples given above are consistent, though it would not be di¢ cult to construct a rule that is not. For example, a rule that distributed according to CEA when there are three claimants and CEL when there are two claimants would not satisfy Consistency.
Symmetry. For every (c; E) 2 C and fi; jg
This states that if two agents have the same claim, then they will get the same award. Of the examples above, Dic is not symmetric. Obviously, we will not use Symmetry in our characterization of asymmetric parametric rules.
Continuity. For every (c; E) 2 C, for every sequence of claims problems c
Young's Theorem states that a division rule has a continuous parametric representation if and only if it satis…es Continuity, Bilateral Consistency, and Symmetry. An important step in the proof is showing that these three axioms imply the following.
Resource Monotonicity states that if the endowment increases, no claimant should get a smaller award. All of the examples given above are resource monotonic, though it would not be di¢ cult to construct a rule that is not.
To characterize asymmetric parametric rules, we include Resource Monotonicity in our set of axioms as it is not implied without Symmetry. We will need to include other axioms as well, as the following example illustrates that Continuity, Consistency, and Resource Monotonicity are not enough to characterize asymmetric parametric rules. Now we extend S 0 to a rule de…ned over any claims problem, not just two-person problems. We call this extension S. First, for any claims problem where 1; 2 6 2 N , 1 This is also a claims problem since and 2 has a claim of c 2 , then 2 is given priority over 1. Etc. then S = P ar, where P ar is any parametric rule (e.g. the Proportional rule). For any other claims problem (where 1 2 N , 2 2 N , or 1; 2 2 N ), S divides the endowment by …rst satisfying the claims of claimants 1 and 2, dividing between them according to S 0 if 1; 2 2 N , and then allocating the remainder of the endowment to the rest of the claimants according to P ar. It is not hard to show that S is continuous, consistent, and resource monotonic, but not symmetric. Now we show that there is no asymmetric parametric representation of S. If there were, then panel (a) of Figure 5 would imply that there exist < 0 such that f 1 (c 1 ; ) is weakly increasing on , which is a contradiction since we already showed that f 1 (c 1 ; 0 ) = c 1 .
The key to understanding this example is recognizing that a rule can implicitly reveal how it allocates between di¤erent claims of one claimant. For example, panel (a) of Figure 5 shows that S gives priority to c 1 over c 2 , while panel (b) shows that S gives priority to c 2 over c 0 1 . Hence, S has implicitly revealed that it gives priority to c 1 over c 0 1 . However, S fails to have an asymmetric parametric representation because panels (c) and (d) reveal the opposite: that S gives priority to c 0 1 over c 1 . The reason why Consistency does not preclude such rules is because it has no force with twoperson groups (because every proper subgroup is a singleton). Hence, what is needed is an axiom that imposes a rule to be intrapersonally consistent.
The following de…nitions will make it easier to formalize this axiom. De…ne
We think of (i; c i ; x i ) as describing an agent, his claim, and his award. For a given rule S, for every (i; c i ; x i ) 2 Y , j 6 = i, and c j 2 R ++ , de…ne the function:
The following lemma shows that we can replace the inf above with min.
Proof. Continuity implies that there exists E 0 such that
Hence G ((i; c i ; x i ) ; j; c j ) is the smallest endowment needed for S to award x i to agent i (when i's and j's respective claims are c i and c j ).
De…ne the binary relation R 1 over Y as follows.
De…nition 1 (i; c i ; x i ) R 1 (j; c j ; x j ) if i 6 = j and G ((i; c i ; x i ) ; j; c j ) G ((j; c j ; x j ) ; i; c i ).
We think of R 1 as the ranking that the rule gives to di¤erent awards; i.e. if (i; c i ; x i ) R 1 (j; c j ; x j ), then the rule will award x i to agent i before it awards x j to agent j (when their respective claims are c i and c j ). Let I 1 and P 1 denote the re‡exive and irre ‡exive parts of R 1 respectively. Obviously, (i; c i ; x i ) P 1 (j; c j ; x j ) if and only if G ((i; c i ; x i ) ; j; c j ) < G ((j; c j ; x j ) ; i; c i ) and (i; c i ; x i ) I 1 (j; c j ; x j ) if and only if G ((i; c i ; x i ) ; j; c j ) = G ((j; c j ; x j ) ; i; c i ).
The next axiom precludes rules like Example 1.
Intrapersonal Consistency is a restriction on the way a division rule implicitly allocates between di¤erent claims of the same claimant. It states that if a rule implicitly ranks (i; c i ; x i ) strictly over (i; c 0 i ; x 0 i ), then it will never implicitly rank (i; c
We now formalize this implicit ranking. De…ne the binary relation R 2 over Y as follows.
Let I 2 and P 2 denote the re ‡exive and irre ‡exive parts of R 2 respectively. De…ne the binary relation C over Y as follows.
So we interpret C to be the "comparable" relation. That is, (i; c i ; x i ) and (i; c 0 i ; x 0 i ) are comparable if there exists some (j; c j ; x j ) that separates them. However it may be that such a (j; c j ; x j ) does not exist, in which case (i; c i ; x i ) and (i; c 0 i ; x 0 i ) would not be comparable. Let / C denote the "not comparable" relation.
Our …nal axiom concerns when two elements of Y should not be comparable. To motivate this axiom, consider the following example.
Example 2 We construct a rule that is continuous, consistent, intrapersonally consistent, and resource monotonic, but which does not have an asymmetric parametric representation. So for every c 0 , f 1 (c 0 ; ) is a step correspondence where
is the location of the step and c 0 is its height. Figure 6 illustrates f 1 . Observe that for any (c; E) 2 C, there exists a unique such that E 2 P i2N f i (c i ; ). So de…ne a division rule S ff i g N as follows. For any (c; E), for i 6 = 1,
and for i = 1, S
where is chosen so that E 2 Observe that if S gives priority to (i; c i ; x i ), then 0 < x i < c i .
Priority Continuity. If S gives priority to (i; c i ; x i ), then there exists > 0 such that for every c
If S gives priority to (i; c i ; x i ), then small perturbations of x i will not be comparable to (i; c i ; x i ). Priority Continuity states that if such is the case, then small perturbations of c i will also not be comparable to (i; c i ; x i ).
Theorem 1 Let S be a division rule over C. Then S has a continuous asymmetric parametric representation if and only if S satis…es Continuity, Priority Continuity, Bilateral Consistency, Intrapersonal Consistency, and Resource Monotonicity.
Proof. The proof is given in the appendix.
The axioms in Theorem 1 are logically independent, meaning no one axiom is implied by the others. (Veri…cation that the following division rules satisfy all the axioms but the one stated is left to the reader.) Continuity. A division rule that satis…es all the axioms but Continuity is as follows. Let ff i g N F be such that f i is strictly increasing in but not jointly continuous for every i. De…ne S according to (1). Then S is not continuous. However, since f i is strictly increasing in for every i, there is no (i; c i ; x i ) 2 Y such that S gives priority to (i; c i ; x i ). So Priority Continuity is satis…ed vacuously. The other axioms can be easily veri…ed.
Priority Continuity. Example 2 satis…es all the axioms but Priority Continuity. Consistency. A division rule which allocates according to P for two-person groups, but CEA for groups larger than two, would satisfy all the axioms but Consistency.
Intrapersonal Consistency. In Example 1, choose S 0 so that there exists c 1 such that any two-person claims problem where claimant 1's claim is c 1 is strictly resource monotonic. Also, choose S 0 so that there exists c 2 such that any two-person claims problem where claimant 2's claim is c 2 is strictly resource monotonic. (These extra conditions are needed to assure that there is no (i; c i ; x i ) 2 Y such that S gives priority to (i; c i ; x i ).) Extend S 0 to a division rule S over arbitrary groups as in Example 1. Then S satis…es all the axioms but Intrapersonal Consistency.
Resource Monotonicity. Let ff i g i6 =1 F be such that f i is strictly increasing in and jointly continuous. Let f 1 : R ++ [a; b] ! R + satisfy f (c 0 ; a) = 0 and f (c 0 ; b) = c 0 for every c 0 2 R ++ , be jointly continuous, but not be weakly increasing in . However, for every i 6 = 1 and for every c 1 ; c i 2 R ++ , let f 1 (c 1 ; ) + f i (c i ; ) be weakly increasing in . De…ne S according to (1).
Second Approach
The second approach we use to characterize the family of asymmetric parametric rules expands the de…nition of a claims problem to allow claimants to have multiple claims. Hence, division rules de…ned on this domain can allocate intrapersonally. An expanded claims problem is a tuple (N; m; c; E) where N N is a …nite group of claimants, m = (m i ) i2N 2 N N is the vector of identities of the claimants, c = (c i ) i2N 2 R N ++ is the vector of their claims, and E 2 R + is the endowment to be divided, all satisfying E P i2N c i . Let K denote the set of expanded claims problems. For a …xed group N , let K N denote the set of claims problems for N . We will typically write an expanded claims problem as (m; c; E) 2 K where it is assumed that the group of claimants is N . Also, we will typically use a hat to denote division rules de…ned over K, such asŜ.
The main di¤erence between a classic claims problem and an expanded claims problem is how a claimant's identity is modeled. In a classic claims problem, i 2 N represents the identity of a claimant. In an expanded claims problem, i 2 N simply enumerates a claimant (we refer to i as the claimant's "number"), while m i represents the identity of the i th claimant. Hence, if m i = m j , then we interpret this to mean that the same individual is in the expanded claims problem twice, something which is precluded in a classic claims problem. Observe that we can identify any classic claims problem in C with an expanded claims problem in K. That is, for (c; E) 2 C, then (n; c; E) 2 K where n i = i for every i 2 N . Thus, informally, "C K."
Continuity and Consistency are easily adapted to an expanded claims problem.
Continuity. For every (m; c; E) 2 K, for every sequence of claims problems m; c
Consistency. For every (m; c; E)
Bilateral Consistency is the same as before. We also assume Symmetry.
Symmetry. For every (m; c; E) 2 K and fi; jg N , if m i = m j and c i = c j , then S i (m; c; E) =Ŝ j (m; c; E).
Here, Symmetry avoids the objections given in the introduction because di¤erent claimants with the same claim can receive di¤erent awards. It is only to "clones" (i.e. claimants with the same identity and claim) that the division rule must give the same award.
For any ff i g N F, we can de…ne a division ruleŜ ff i g N over the domain of expanded claims problems as follows. For every i 2 N ,
where is chosen so that P i2N f m i (c i ; ) = E. We say a ruleŜ has an asymmetric parametric representation ff i g N F if for every (m; c; E) 2 C, there exists 2 [a; b] such that for every i 2 N ,Ŝ i (m; c; E) = f m i (c i ; ).
Theorem 2 LetŜ be a division rule over K. ThenŜ has a continuous asymmetric parametric representation if and only ifŜ satis…es Continuity, Bilateral Consistency, and Symmetry.
Theorem 2 is actually a special case of a result from Kaminski (2006, Theorem 1) . In that paper, a claims problem is an object (t; E) 2 T R ++ , where T is a separable topological space that represents possible "types" for the claimants. Both the classic claims problem (where T = R ++ ) and the expanded claims problem (where T = N R ++ ) are special cases. Kaminski's main result characterizes parametric division rules in this setting using Continuity, Bilateral Consistency, and Symmetry. Thus, Young's Theorem is a special case when T = R ++ and Theorem 2 is a special case when T = N R ++ .
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Even though Theorem 2 follows formally from Kaminski's theorem, there is a conceptual di¤erence between the two. Kaminski interprets a claimant's type to contain "non-personal information essential for the rationing problem" (p. 117). That is, a claimant's identity cannot be part of his type. However this restriction is merely an interpretation of the formal model, and is not relevant to the validity of Theorem 2.
Equivalence of the Two Approaches
In this section, we show that the two approaches to characterizing the family of asymmetric parametric rules are essentially equivalent. This is actually a simple exercise. This is because the family of parametric functions F used to de…ne an asymmetric parametric rule is the same in the two approaches.
Recall from Section 4 that we can identify any classic claims problem in C with an expanded claims problem in K with the mapping (c; E) 7 ! (n; c; E), where n i = i for every i 2 N . Thus we think of K as a larger set of claims problems that contains C. For any division ruleŜ over K, we can de…ne a division rule S over C by looking at howŜ divides over C. That is:
where n i = i for every i 2 N . The following result shows that (3) maps continuous asymmetric parametric rules de…ned over K to continuous asymmetric parametric rules over C.
Theorem 3 LetŜ be a continuous asymmetric parametric rule over K. Let S be a division rule over C de…ned fromŜ by (3). Then S is a continuous asymmetric parametric rule.
Proof. Let ff i g N F be a continuous representation ofŜ. It is obvious that ff i g N also represents S. Hence, S is a continuous asymmetric parametric rule over C.
Now we go the other direction by showing that any continuous asymmetric parametric rule over C can be extended to a continuous asymmetric parametric rule over K.
De…nition 5 Let S be a division rule over C and letŜ be a division rule over K. Then S andŜ agree on C if for every (c; E) 2 C, S (c; E) =Ŝ (n; c; E) where n i = i for every i 2 N . We sayŜ is an extension of S over K.
Theorem 4 Let S be a continuous asymmetric parametric rule over C. Then there exists a continuous asymmetric parametric extension of S over K. Moreover, ifŜ is a continuous asymmetric parametric extension of S to K, then there exists ff i g N F continuous that represents both S andŜ.
Proof. Let ff i g N F be a continuous representation of S. De…neŜ Now letŜ be a continuous asymmetric parametric extension of S to K. Let ff i g N F be a continuous representation ofŜ. Since S andŜ agree on C, it is obvious that ff i g N is a continuous representation of S.
Conclusion
We used two approaches to characterize the family of asymmetric parametric division rules. The key to understanding the di¤erence between these two approaches is in recognizing that an asymmetric parametric rule has the potential to allocate intrapersonally. In the …rst approach, intrapersonal allocation is precluded by de…n-ition. Thus how a rule allocates intrapersonally can only be inferred by how a rule allocates interpersonally. In the second approach, intrapersonal allocation is explicitly allowed. The second approach has the advantage of using simpler, well-known axioms. However, the domain is arguably unrealistic, and it obscures the properties that asymmetric parametric rules satisfy under the domain of classic claims problems. The advantage of the …rst approach is that it makes explicit these properties, even though these properties are admittedly not as easy to understand.
A Proof of Theorem 1
Verifying that the axioms are necessary is a straightforward exercise. We show now that the axioms are su¢ cient.
When they are well-de…ned, m (i; c i ;
De…ne the binary relation R 3 over Y as follows.
Lemma 3 R is complete.
Proof. For every (i; c i ; x i ) and (j; c j ; x j ), either (i) i 6 = j, (ii) i = j and (i; c i ;
A.1 R Is Transitive
Lemma 4 For every i; j; k distinct, for every c i ; c j ; c k 2 R ++ , for every
there exists E such that ; c j ) ; G ((i; c i ; x i ) ; j; c j )) = (x i ; G ((i; c i ; x i ) ; j; c j )
If either of these inequalities are strict, then
Lemma 5 R is transitive.
Case 1 -i; j; k distinct. By Lemma 4, there exists E, E 0 , and E 00 such that
with one of these strict. Since (i; c i ; x i ) R 1 (j; c j ; x j ), G ((i; c i ; x i ) ; j; c j ) G ((j; c j ; x j ) ; i; c i ).
and
By de…nition, G ((i; c i ; x i ) ; k; c k ) x i + G ((j; c j ; x j ) ; k; c k ) x j . But this contradicts inequality (5).
Similarly, it must be that
Case 2 -i = k 6 = j.
Then there exists (j 0 ; c j 0 ; x j 0 ) where j 0 6 = i such that A.2 Countable R-dense Subset Lemma 6 (i; c i ; x i ) P 1 (j; c j ; x j ) if and only if x i + x j > G ((i; c i ; x i ) ; j; c j ).
Proof. By Lemma 1, S ((c i ; c j ) ; G ((i; c i ; x i ) ; j; c j )) = (x i ; G ((i; c i ; x i ) ; j; c j ) x i ) and S ((c i ; c j ) ; G ((j; c j ; x j ) ; i; c i )) = (G ((j; c j ; x j ) ; i; c i ) x j ; x j ) .
()) So G ((i; c i ; x i ) ; j; c j ) < G ((j; c j ; x j ) ; i; c i ). Resource Monotonicity implies G ((i; c i ; x i ) ; j; c j ) x i x j . If G ((i; c i ; x i ) ; j; c j ) x i = x j , then S ((c i ; c j ) ; G ((i; c i ; x i ) ; j; c j )) = (x i ; x j ). But this would imply G ((i; c i ; x i ) ; j; c j ) G ((j; c j ; x j ) ; i; c i ) by de…nition of G, a contradiction. Hence, G ((i; c i ; x i ) ; j; c j ) Lemma 9 If (i; c i ; x i ) P (j; c j ; x j ), then there exists > 0 such that for every x 0 j 2 (x j ; x j ), (i; c i ; x i ) P j; c j ; x 0 j P (j; c j ; x j ) .
Proof. Case 1 -i 6 = j.
By Lemma 6, (i; c i ; x i ) P 1 (j; c j ; x j ) implies x i + x j > G ((i; c i ; x i ) ; j; c j ). Set
Then for x 0 j 2 (x j ; x j ), x i + x 0 j > G ((i; c i ; x i ) ; j; c j ). So (i; c i ; x i ) P 1 j; c j ; x 0 j by Lemma 6, while j; c j ; x 0 j P (j; c j ; x j ) by Lemma 8. Case 2 -i = j. So let (i; c i ; x i ) P (i;ĉ i ;x i ).
-(
Then there exists (k; c k ; x k ) where k 6 = i such that (i; c i ;
where one of these is strict. By Case 1, it is without loss of generality that
Also by Case 1, there exists > 0 such that for everyx 
i . Hence Lemma 8 implies (i;ĉ i ; x 00 i ) P 2 (i;ĉ i ;x i ). So there exists (j; c j ; x j ) such that (i;ĉ i ; x 00 i ) R 1 (j; c j ; x j ) R 1 (i;ĉ i ;x i ), with one of these strict. Lemma 9 implies that it is without loss of generality that (j; c j ; x j ) P 1 (i;ĉ i ;x i ). But then Lemma 9 implies that there exists x 0 <x i such that (j; c j ; x j ) P 1 (i;ĉ i ; x 0 ) P (i;ĉ i ;x i ). This implies (i;ĉ i ; x 00 i ) R 1 (j; c j ; x j ) P 1 (i;ĉ i ; x 0 ) which implies (i;ĉ i ; x 0 ) C (i;ĉ i ; x 
Proof. So x i < x 0 i by Lemma 8 and (i; c i ; x i ) P 1 (j; c j ; x j ) by transitivity of R. By Lemma 6, G ((i; c i ; x i ) ; j; c j ) < x i + x j and x 0 i + x j G ((j; c j ; x j ) ; i; c i ). Since x i < x 0 i , this implies G ((i; c i ; x i ) ; j; c j ) < x i + x j < G ((j; c j ; x j ) ; i; c i ) .
Hence Resource Monotonicity implies
Lemma 12 If (i; c i ; x i ) R 1 (j; c j ; x j ), then x i S i ((c i ; c j ) ; x i + x j ) and x j S j ((c i ; c j ) ; x i + x j ).
Proof. By Lemma 6, x i + x j G ((j; c j ; x j ) ; i; c i ). Resource Monotonicity implies
Case 1 -S gives left priority to (j; c j ; x j ).
By Lemma 10, there existsĉ j 2 Q ++ (because Q is dense in R) andx j ĉ j such that (j;ĉ j ;x j ) I 3 (j; c j ; x j ). By Lemma 9, there existsx 0 j 2 Q + wherex 0 j <x j such that (i; c i ; x i ) P j;ĉ j ;x 0 j P (j;ĉ j ;x j ) I (j; c j ; x j ) . So j;ĉ j ;x 0 j 2 Y 0 and (i; c i ; x i ) P j;ĉ j ;x 0 j P (j; c j ; x j ). Case 2 -S does not give left priority to (j; c j ; x j ). By Lemma 9, there exists x 0 j and x 00 j such that (i; c i ; x i ) P j; c j ; x 00 j P j; c j ; x 0 j P (j; c j ; x j ) .
Since S does not give left priority to (j; c j ; x j ), there exists (k; c k ; x k ) where k 6 = j such that j; c j ; x 0 j R 1 (k; c k ; x k ) R 1 (j; c j ; x j ) with one of these strict. It is without loss of generality that j; c j ; x 0 j P 1 (k; c k ; x k ) P 1 (j; c j ; x j ).
5 Lemma 9 implies that there exists x 0 k such that j; c j ; x 0 j P 1 (k; c k ; x 0 k ) P (k; c k ; x k ). Hence (i; c i ; x i ) P j; c j ; x 00 j P j; c j ; x 0 j P 1 (k; c k ; x 0 k ) P (k; c k ; x k ) P 1 (j; c j ; x j ) .
5 If j; c j ; x 0 j I 1 (k; c k ; x k ), then Lemma 9 implies there exists x 00 j such that (i; c i ; x i ) P 1 j; c j ; x 00 j P j; c j ; x 0 j I 1 (k; c k ; x k ).
If (k; c k ; x k ) I 1 (j; c j ; x j ), then Lemma 9 implies there existsx k such that j; c j ; x 0 j P 1 (k; c k ;x k ) P (k; c k ; x k ) I 1 (j; c j ; x j ). Hence without loss of generality, (k; c k ; x k ) P 1 (j; c j ; x j ).
Claim there exists > 0 such that for everyĉ k 2 (c k ; c k + ), (k;ĉ k ; x 0 k ) P 1 (j; c j ; x j ). Suppose not. Then for every n 2 N, there exists c These two claims imply that there exists > 0 such that for everyĉ k 2 (c k ; c k + ), j; c j ; x 00 j P 1 (k;ĉ k ; x 0 k ) P 1 (j; c j ; x j ). Since Q is dense in R, without loss of generality, there existsĉ k 2 Q ++ such that j; c j ; x 00 j P 1 (k;ĉ k ; x 0 k ) P 1 (j; c j ; x j ). Lemma 9 implies that there existsx k 2 Q + such that j; c j ; x 00 j P 1 (k;ĉ k ;x k ) P (k;ĉ k ; x 0 k ). Hence, (k;ĉ k ;x k ) 2 Y 0 and (i; c i ; x i ) P (k;ĉ k ;x k ) P 1 (j; c j ; x j ).
A.3 Finishing the Proof
Lemma 14 There exists r : Y ! R such that (i; c i ; x i ) R (j; c j ; x j ) , r (i; c i ; x i ) r (j; c j ; x j ) .
Proof. This is a standard result following from Lemmas 3, 5, and 13.
Lemma 15 For every (c; E) 2 C, i; j 2 N , and 2 (0; c j S j (c; E)), r (i; c i ; S i (c; E)) < r (j; c j ; S j (c; E) + ) .
Proof. Let (c; E) 2 C, i; j 2 N , and 2 (0; c j S j (c; E)) 6 = ; be given. Set x S (c; E). Bilateral Consistency implies S ((c i ; c j ) ; x i + x j ) = (x i ; x j ). By the de…nition of G, G ((i; c i ; x i ) ; j; c j )
x i + x j . Also, Resource Monotonicity implies x i + x j < G ((j; c j ; x j + ) ; i; c i ). Hence, G ((i; c i ; x i ) ; j; c j ) < G ((j; c j ; x j + ) ; i; c i ), which implies (i; c i ; x i ) P 1 (j; c j ; x j + ), which implies r (i; c i ; x i ) < r (j; c j ; x j + ). Similarly one can show x x. Hence x =x.
